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The following study provides a risk analysis of the forthcoming nationwide healthcare 
information system in Germany. Based on the information security audit methodology 
of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), we evaluated the introduction of 
the new system in hospitals with respect to security. Conceptually, the study focuses 
explicitly on an organizational level; specifically the use of healthcare telematics 
components such as electronic health card and health professional card. A dual 
approach of both security process and risk analysis thereby established an adequate 
level of information security. For this purpose, an appropriate framework specifically 
designed for the clinical area is first developed and explained in detail. Based on these 
perceptions it is possible to precisely check the workflows “patient admission” and 
“prescription of medicine” for inherent organizational threats. The aim of this paper is 
to propose appropriate steps to mitigate potential risks before German healthcare 
telematics comes into use. 




As part of a larger health sector reform in 2006, the introduction of the electronic health 
card (EHC) in Germany was decided. For the first time, modern information technology 
is being introduced on a wider range in the health sector. A network of data crossing the 
boundaries of single medical institutions (medical practices, hospitals, pharmacies etc.) 
opens many new possibilities and prospects. The electronic health card should have 
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come into use in 2006, but due to various problems the introduction of the cards has 
been delayed. Although the exact extent of applications to be offered by the EHC is 
subject of a controversial debate at the moment, there is no question that it will have a 
significant impact on workflows in medical institutions. While technical issues have 
been widely discussed (Sunyaev, Leimeister and Krcmar, 2008), less attention has been 
paid to organizational matters. The impact on hospitals and their business processes has, 
especially, been broadly ignored in the past.  
This paper examines the changes in clinical workflows and reveals inherent 
organizational hazards. By doing so, this work demonstrates information systems 
research (ISR) in its truest sense: presentation of a real-world problem, its analysis, 
corresponding lessons learned and the provision of solutions for further development. 
The conducted analysis is based on the well-known framework by the German Federal 
Office for Information Security (BSI). 
2 The BSI Risk Management Framework 
The BSI offers a methodology that provides efficient management of information 
security which can be adapted to the specific circumstances of any institution. The 
framework, known as “IT baseline protection”, bundles different established approaches 
and represents a standard for establishing and maintaining adequate protection of all 
information in a predefined organization. 
  
Figure 1: The BSI risk management framework 
 
A fundamental requirement for achieving adequate protection is the execution of a risk 
analysis. Reasonable results can be expected only if a formal and unified approach is 
followed. The basic idea of the risk analysis by BSI is that risks can arise due to both 
flawed conditions and from within the institution itself through poorly protected 
business processes.  
This situation is the reason why the reference model distinguishes between two sets of 
activities: The initiation of a security process and the “actual” risk analysis. Both parts 
together form a unit. During the phase of the security process all necessary parameters 
are set in order to guarantee data security against “external” threats. The risk analysis, 
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however, is applied directly to the workflows in order to uncover vulnerabilities and 
find appropriate solutions.  
3 Initiation of security process 
3.1 Responsibility of hospital management 
Along with the introduction of the electronic health card, information technology is 
becoming an increasingly important issue in hospitals. There can be no doubt that 
management has to prioritize the maintenance of security and adherence to guidelines. 
However, surveys reveal that even in big institutions this is not always the case (Dinnie, 
1999). The situation in German hospitals is even worse as information from the data 
protection commissioners’ manifest reveals. As a matter of principle, information 
security is considered to be a “problem of other people”. The responsibility is usually 
delegated and redelegated until, ultimately, no one considers himself responsible for it 
(BSI, 2008). 
This situation prevents medical institutions from reaching adequate levels of 
information security. The situation won’t change significantly until the management of 
the hospital is given sole responsibility for security. Furthermore, the responsibility of 
the management is the fundamental prerequisite for the next steps of initiating the 
security process. 
3.2 Conceptual design and planning of the security process 
Using an approach of three steps, the major issues related to the basic conditions of 
medical institutions are resolved, followed by the definition of security objectives, from 
which ultimately an adequate level of security can be derived.  
To ensure a certain methodology, the most important business and technical tasks and 
their need for information security have to be determined. The cohesion between 
workflows on the one hand and the information processed respectively the required IT 
on the other hand is the basis for the decision about which security level is appropriate 
to protect the institution. The processed information for the most striking workflows is 
shown in table 1. 
Table 1: Processed information for the most important activities in hospitals 
Category Activity Processed information 
Administrative 
Patient admission 
First and last name, sex, birth date, address, name of 
health insurance (Gematik, 2008c) 
Electronic referral 
i.a. writer, addressee (doctor or hospital), optionally 
assignment 
Hybrid Electronic prescription 
i.a. name of medicine, packaging size, id (Gematik, 
2008b) 
Medical 
Ambulant or in-patient 
treatment 
i.a. diagnoses, radiographs, findings, correspondence 
First-aid treatment 
i.a. intolerance to medicine, allergies, chronic ailments, 
additional important facts for cases of emergencies 
(Gematik, 2008a) 
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Based on table 1, it is possible to evaluate the processed information with regard to its 
need for confidentiality, integrity and availability. Data are especially at risk when they 
have a high value to certain groups. Considered which conclusion employers or 
insurance companies could draw out of these data this also applies for the electronic 
health record (Huber, Sunyaev and Krcmar, 2008). Therefore the security level for the 
health record and the limited swift of data for emergencies has to be “very high”. In 
contrast, administrative data have a far lower value and consequently the need for 
protection is comparatively “low”.  
A similar picture emerges from patient information that is processed during referrals, as 
the name of the receiving doctor alone is no source for useful knowledge. A slightly 
higher sensitivity results only if the referral is associated with an optional assignment. In 
this case the security level can be determined as “medium”. The prescription of 
medicine, moreover, can be classified to the same category because the processed 
information gives a clue about the health in general or even specific diseases of the 
patient. Yet, a holistic picture, such as from the electronic health record, cannot be 
derived. The collected evidence is presented in table 2. 
Table 2: Required security level for processed information 
Required security level Kind of information 
low 
Administrative data 
Referral (without assignment) 
medium 
Electronic prescriptions 
Referral (including assignment) 
high 
Electronic health records 
Data for emergencies 
 
The results obtained will be used to develop security goals for hospitals. Only a 
complete and appropriate definition of security objectives will avoid the risk of 
developing strategies and approaches that fail to meet the actual requirements. This may 
mean that unwanted risks are being taken but also that too many resources are being 
invested into improper security precautions (BSI, 2008). The main goals related to data 
security in hospitals are described subsequently: 
 Information about the health of patients must be of high quality, since it 
constitutes the basis for further treatments. 
 The security precautions of the EHC must not disturb smooth workflows. 
 Legal requirements must be met. 
 Users of the hospital information system must only be allowed to access files 
corresponding to their authorization; unauthorized access must be prevented 
(Gematik, 2008e). 
 Maximum transparency has to be ensured. The rights of the patient must not be 
restricted. 
This set of objectives forms a basis for all further actions. However, it is important to 
understand that defining the security level should not imply that individual business 
processes all share the same demands for security. In fact, certain activities require, due 
to their characteristics, special and individualized analysis. 
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Based on their extraordinary importance, it is necessary to carry out an investigation of 
two workflows that are directly affected by the introduction of the electronic health 
card: patient admissions and electronic prescription of medicine. These two activities 
will also be investigated for inherent hazards by the risk analysis, which is the second 
part of the BSI framework. The definition of the individual, appropriate security level is 
based on ISO 27001 (2005), where the three aspects “confidentiality”, “integrity” and 
“availability” are distinguished. A deep analysis for the patient admission results in a 
desired level of security which is “normal”. Obviously, the process of prescribing 
medicine requires an entirely different protection since the data processed are more 
critical. Taking all aspects into account the prescription of medicine requires a “high” 
protection level. 
By now, all necessary information has been gathered and therefore, the conceptual 
designing and planning of the security process is complete. The deployment can be 
prepared in a further step. 
3.3 Guideline for information security 
Actual improvement of comprehensive security is only possible if the security 
objectives and security strategy are communicated to all employees of the institution. 
For this reason, a guideline is required, i.e. a document which expresses the main 
principles of the security strategy in a clear and understandable way.  
It is the central strategy document for the entire institution, so the guideline needs to be 
designed in a way that all recipients can identify with it. Therefore briefness and 
conciseness are basic requirements for the document. In practice, a document more than 
20 pages in length will probably be a failure (BSI, 2008). Only the field of application, 
the security objectives (as shown in 3.2), the security strategy (as discussed within the 
security process) and the organization of the security process (as shown below) should 
be included.  
3.4 Organization of the security process 
Even a well-designed security process only contributes to a better protection if it is 
executed in a suitable way. The organizational structure and security management of the 
institution should be designed in a way that makes them compatible with one another.  
In order to define an appropriate organizational structure, the activities occurring in the 
area of information security have to be recorded and named. A detailed analysis of 
hospital procedures shows that it is possible to divide occurring tasks - independent of 
the specific institution - into four categories: (a) Information security in the narrowest 
sense; (b) Executive functions; (c) Data protection and (d) Pure IT work. 
In order to define an appropriate organizational structure, it is necessary to link 
individual activities from the categories above to a role. Unlike the term “job”, which 
describes the scope of a single employee, a “role” delivers no information about its 
associated effort. In hospitals, there is the role of the management, which is responsible 
for the administrative functions. Furthermore, according to German law (BDSG, 2009) 
it is necessary to commission a data protection officer, as “personal data is processed 
automatically”. IT work can therefore be assigned to the IT department. Consequently, 
only the activities from the category “information security in the narrowest sense” are 
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left over. The BSI risk management framework suggests the establishment of the role of 
security administrator for these tasks (BSI, 2008). From this, a reference model for an 
organizational structure of hospitals concerning security is proposed (figure 2). 
  
Figure 2: Reference model for the organizational structure 
The implementation of these concepts is already an important step towards greater 
information security. The security process is fully designed and ready to be introduced 
in the hospital. All necessary parameters are set in order to guarantee data security 
against “external” threats. But risks also arise from the business processes themselves. 
For this reason, it is necessary to carry out a special risk analysis for three workflows 
that are directly affected by the introduction of the electronic health card. 
4 Risk analysis 
4.1 Research approach 
First, the scope of the analysis must be defined. This step ensures maximum 
transparency and thoroughness, so that all potential threats are detected in the risk 
analysis. The subsequent structural analysis is about the preliminary investigation of 
information that is useful for the later detection of potential threats. The workflow 
examined is described in great detail. The goal is to create a substantial and formal 
foundation on which the risk analysis can be constructed. The actual process of 
detecting hazards is about the analysis of every aspect in respect to vulnerabilities and 
risks.  
To get a better overview of the threat level, the hazards identified in the risk analysis are 
classified. In the final and most important part of the risk analysis, possible solutions are 
developed to explain how the threats can be dealt with appropriately. Each threat is 
analyzed individually to determine whether complete prevention is possible or whether 
the limitation of risk is reasonable. 
4.2 Admission of patients 
The scope of analysis includes all sub-processes of the patient admission that are 
affected by the introduction of the electronic health card. Aspects such as the internal 
scheduling of the hospital or the procedure in the event of EHC systems going offline 
haven’t changed compared to the old system. The structural analysis assumes that the 
patient is conscious. This applies to any ambulant and in-patient admission but it might 
not be the case with emergency treatments. In such cases, admission will then be done 
retroactively at a later date, so this scenario can be ignored. 
 




Figure 3: Model for the process “patient admission” 
 
The threat analysis serves as a basis for the detection of threats. Based on the structural 
analysis, a systematic search and identification of threats along the workflow is possible 
(table 3). 
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Table 3: Threats arising from the patient admission 
No. Inherent threats 
#1.1 
Patient has an electronic health card, but delivers the old insurance card. Consequently, services 
that should prevent malpractice can be bypassed. The danger arises because the old insurance 
card does not need to be returned. It is valid at least until the nationwide launch of the EHC, 
which may happen around four years from now. 
#1.2 
There is no legal compulsion to submit a photo for the EHC. The insurance protection remains 
nonetheless (Juerjens and Rumm, 2008). This legal loophole enables misuse. 
#1.3 
The photograph is not being checked by the insurance company. Legally, this is not obligatory. It 
is already apparent that companies won’t validate the picture due to short-term financial benefits. 
Consequently, it is possible for the insured to deliver intentionally unclear photographs or even 
photographs of another person. 
#1.4 
The employee does not compare the photograph with the patient’s identity. This hazard arises 
mainly due to the increasing workload of hospital staff in hospitals, which motivates employees 
to search for ways to speed up the workflows. Such a scenario would be intentional ignorance of 
the photo validation requirement. 
#1.5 
At the moment there is no defined procedure if the photograph and the patient’s identity don’t 
match. 
#1.6 
There is also no defined procedure in case of unclear correspondence between the patient and 
photograph. 
#1.7 
The process of updating the administrative data is aborted manually. Therefore, there is a risk 
that employees could use the manual abort function (Häber et al., 2009) to save time. This 
makes fraud possible. 
#1.8 At the moment, there is no defined procedure for the event that the EHC is not valid. 
#1.9 
Personal information about the health of the patient can be derived from the electronic referrals. 
This problem arises particularly when the patient has to choose the appropriate referral on the 
display. Data protection is not guaranteed in this situation. 
#1.10 
The employee selects the proper referral on the display right by himself. In practice, such an 
approach leads to a faster process but it can also create conflicts related to the patient’s right to 
self-determination. 
#1.11 
The process of choosing the proper referral on a display is too complicated for some patients. 
Reasons may include sanitary restrictions or language problems.  
#1.12 
Technical issues complicate the use of an appropriate referral. In this case, no procedure is 
defined at the moment. 
#1.13 
A patient forgets their electronic health card inside the reading device. This is far more 
problematic than the loss of the former insurance card as the patient will find it difficult to access 
medicine without their EHC. 
 
Regarding the consequences of the risks, the damage can be classified into three 
categories: Financial loss for the health insurance providers, violation of data protection 
law, and discomfort for patients. The three categories now serve as the starting point for 
the development of solutions for the threats. The goal is to prevent as many risks as 
possible by eliminating their cause. If there is no complete solution then, at least, the 
probability of their occurring should be limited. Fortunately, the results of a 
comprehensive analysis show that most threats can be entirely avoided by relatively 
simple measures. There are, for example, two solutions for the scenario of criminals 
using old insurance cards instead of the EHC. First, the patient may be asked to return 
his old insurance card upon receipt of the new electronic health card. If he fails to do so 
and continues to use the existing card, he should become a self-paying patient. Another 
quite simple approach would be the reduction of the transition period in which both 
systems can be used. But there is also a good method to ensure that patients deliver a 
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correct photograph for the EHC: As the insured person has to submit a photo by mail or 
digital communications anyway, it would be easy to add a copy of an official identity 
document, e.g. identity card, passport or driver’s license. The check for compliance 
does not involve unreasonable costs for the health insurance companies but would avoid 
a major risk. 
Threats arising from undefined procedures can also be eliminated completely by 
developing instructions for these specific scenarios. Consider at first the cases of 
unclear match between the photo on the EHC and the patient’s identity. The easiest way 
is to ask the insurant for another identity document. If there is no compliance, a 
suspicion of abuse is existent and therefore, the health insurance company needs to be 
notified (Sunyaev et al, 2009a). Furthermore, the employee is entitled to confiscate the 
doubtful card. However, far more complicated is the question whether a patient has a 
right to receive medical treatments despite abuse. In principle, the German policy of 
compulsory treatment implies that a doctor cannot refuse a patient from a public health 
insurance provider. Indeed, a decision from the German administration court says that it 
is not evident, “from which legal obligation a compulsory treatment arises”, if the 
patient cannot submit his health card (Weichert, 2006). Only in “urgent cases” is 
immediate treatment mandatory. Therefore, the procedure is defined and the staff can be 
briefed appropriately. 
Undoubtedly those risks that directly relate to the behaviour of employees can at least 
be minimized. Reality has shown that a clear and understandable explanation of the 
purpose and value of security measures has significant positive effects on employee 
behaviour. With regard to the threat of a possible loss of the EHC in the reading device, 
the following solution has proven to be of value: based on a similar scenario at cash 
dispensers, the problem could be minimized by a procedure that completes the entire 
procedure only after the card has been removed from the reader. This technique should 
be adapted to the health sector. 
4.3 Prescription of medicine 
The prescription of medicine describes the process of issuing the required schedules that 
allow a patient to purchase a specific drug. In Germany there are three kinds of 
prescriptions: prescriptions from the compulsory health insurance providers, private 
prescriptions, and prescriptions for narcotic substances. The migration from a manual 
procedure to an electronic process refers primarily to the first kind. However, private 
prescriptions differ only in the aspect of patient co-payment - the organizational 
processes remain the same, so the analysis results can be adopted. In contrast, 
prescriptions for narcotic substances need to fulfil very high security requirements. 
Since an adequate electronic implementation is currently impossible, these prescriptions 
are not processed by the telematics infrastructure (Gematik, 2008d) and are therefore 
not part of the analysis. 
 




Figure 4: Model for the process of prescribing medicine 
 
A sequential analysis of the workflow described in regards to any possible problems 
results in the threats shown in table 4. 
Table 4: Threats arising from the prescription of medicine 
No. Inherent threats 
#2.1 
The paper prescription is still exhibited excessively. The threat arises because the old, paper-
based system will be preserved as a back-up alternative due to security issues. This carries the 
risk that the electronic referrals aren’t applied to their full extent, which would mean massive 
financial loss for the compulsory health insurance. 
#2.2 
The health professional card remains with the employees at the reception. The plugging and 
unplugging of the card could be considered inconvenient. Concerns have been raised that 
doctors will sooner or later deposit their cards permanently near the reading device. 
#2.3 
Waiting times expand because of the location of the reading devices. This means inconvenience 
to the patients and slower workflows. 
#2.4 
The prescribed medicine is not reviewed during the signing process by the doctor. Due to the 
high number of prescriptions, the danger arises that the doctor enters his PIN “blindly” and as a 
result the wrong medication is prescribed. 
#2.5 
The correction of false prescriptions might lead to significant delays. If the doctor recognizes 
such a mistake on the display, the specific prescription needs to be deleted or corrected within 
the hospital information system. This might take a while and cause serious delays. 
#2.6 
PIN of the health professional card is compromised. The high number of necessary prescriptions 
forces the doctors to enter their PIN very often. This implies a considerable risk that the secret 
code can be stolen and misused (BSI, 2007). 
#2.7 
Doctor gives his PIN to the staff at the reception. A completely new dimension in bypassing 
security mechanisms occurs if the employees at the front desk are allowed to prescribe medicine 
themselves. This scenario is not impossible as many doctor’s practice today make a habit of 
storing prescription forms with blank signatures at the reception. 
#2.8 The choice between local and central storage of electronic referrals confuses the patients. 
#2.9 
A patient forgets their electronic health card inside the reading device. This is far more 
problematic than the loss of the former insurance card, as the patient cannot access any 
medicine without their EHC. 
#2.10 
The doctor forgets his health professional card inside the reading device. This incident is 
problematic as the doctor is virtually paralyzed in the telematics environment without his card.  




In the context of the process workflow “prescription of medicine”, three categories of 
damage could be identified: In addition to financial loss for insurance companies and 
discomfort for patients, which are familiar from the analysis of first process, a new 
category called “bypassing security measures” is added.  
Fortunately, five of the ten recognized threats can be completely avoided by eliminating 
their causes. The theft of PIN numbers from health professional cards could be 
prevented by using a biometric identification system, e.g. a fingerprint scan. This would 
both prevent abuse and speed up the workflow. The danger of the doctor leaving his 
personal identification number at the reception desk would be solved as well. Given 
these significant advantages, it is incomprehensible that the provider of the EHC has 
developed such concepts but has not yet scheduled their implementation (Sunyaev et al, 
2009b). Regarding patient inconvenience resulting from a faulty prescription, the 
following procedure is a possible solution: employees at the reception desk should be 
allowed to access and correct prescription data in the hospital information system. As 
some hospitals will probably take the line of the least resistance and simply keep their 
paper-based prescription systems, automated controls should be introduced. Finally, the 
currently proposed freedom of choice between central and local storage of prescriptions 
is unnecessary. Although both alternatives certainly have assets and drawbacks, the 
consequence may be confusion among patients. The provider of the EHC should make a 
clear decision.  
The occurrence of at least three more threats can also be limited. A major problem is the 
risk that doctors might deposit their health professional card at the reception desk. This 
threat should be solved in two ways: Both doctors and the administration personnel 
should be educated about the importance of strict compliance with all regulations. 
Furthermore, the medical association should provide a basis for sanctioning misconduct. 
The threat of forgetting the health card or the health professional card has already been 
examined during the analysis of patient admission. In principle, the same solution can 
be applied, i.e. the prescription process should only terminate after both cards have been 
removed from the reading device. Adding an acoustic signal would help to reduce the 
risk even more. 
5 Conclusion 
Perfect security in information technology is neither technically or organizationally 
possible, nor economically viable. Security is always subjective and depends on the 
threats facing each individual institution. The variety of factors affecting security makes 
the protection of information technology a very complex task. Implementation, 
maintenance, development and evaluation should therefore be based on a reliable 
reference model that covers all aspects of information security. 
The analysis of organizational aspects of the electronic health card in hospitals is 
therefore based on the risk management framework from the German BSI. The basic 
idea of the risk analysis is that threats arise due both to flawed conditions and from the 
institutions themselves through poorly protected workflows. Consequently, this study 
distinguished two sets of measures: the initiation of a security process and a risk 
analysis. Both parts together form a unit and have been applied to the introduction of the 
electronic health card in hospitals. The result is a comprehensive examination of 
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potential organizational risks. Regarding the organizational framework, ambiguous 
responsibilities are a major threat. The study explains in detail why an active role for 
hospital management is an indispensable component of a viable organization. A major 
achievement is the developed reference model that provides an appropriate structure and 
allocation of roles for hospitals regardless of their size. With both the guideline on 
information security and the proposed catalogue to a meaningful involvement of all 
stakeholders in the security process, two instruments have been introduced that will 
effectively contribute to the protection of the sensitive health data. An important 
intermediate result is the evaluation of the required protection level for selected 
workflows, which forms the basis for the risk analysis. An approach consisting of five 
sequential steps made it possible to identify threats within the business processes 
“patient admission” and “prescription of medicine”. A total of 22 unique hazards could 
be categorized into four different classes of damage. The developed measures provide 
solutions for most of the threats: 11 problems can be avoided completely by eliminating 
their cause and another 8 risks are limited in terms of the likelihood of their occurrence.  
The study shows that an appropriate level of security can be achieved in hospitals. For 
this purpose, the proposed measures must be implemented fully and consistently. In the 
long term, new risks will probably arise. It will be the task of the provider gematik to 
react both quickly and appropriately to any upcoming dangers and thus maintain the 
effectiveness of the security mechanisms on a sustained basis. The conducted analysis 
contributes to a topic that will affect any person in Germany for the upcoming decades 
and that directly concerns a domain oriented risk analysis (with rising importance to 
ISR). 
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